Addressing Pakistan's Nuclear Threat

The nuclear threat to India from Pakistan is real. Reports indicate that India's and Pakistan's nuclear arsenal is on par¹. Reports also indicate that Pakistan is stockpiling nuclear warheads at the rate of about 20 a year² and poised to become the third largest nuclear armed country³. India has repeatedly stated its traditional policy of not using nuclear weapons first and not targeting non-nuclear weapons nations. India has also indicated that it is prepared to convert these into bilateral or multilateral legally binding “No First Use” (NFU) agreements incorporating these two principles, while ruling out joining the non-proliferation treaty⁴. Pakistan on the other hand has made no such indications. Being the weaker of the two nations, it holds the nuclear option as a threat to mitigate massive losses in the event of an all out war. Pakistan Foreign Secretary Aizaz Ahmad Chaudhry said that his country has “low-yield, tactical nuclear weapons” (TNWs) to deal with India’s so-called Cold Start doctrine⁵.

TNWs are usually short range lower-intensity “tactical” weapons, whereas strategic weapons are high-intensity long range weapons. This disclosure of possessing TNWs prompts India to update its Nuclear Doctrine⁶.

While India has always maintained it wishes to coexist peacefully with Pakistan, the reverse doesn't hold true. Consequently, India has to temper and measure its responses to Pakistan's border infractions with no clear advantage of possessing nuclear weapons. To counter this, India has to develop a strategy to counter this disadvantage.

The worst case scenario is if Pakistan, when pushed to the wall, experiences a break down in the change of command resulting in a rogue nuclear attack, which is then responded to by India, with force majure, resulting in a Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD)⁷ and the possible annihilation of Pakistan. No one in their right mind would wish this, but the specter of nuclear war prompted George Fernandes, as India's Defense Minister in 2003, to allude to this response⁸.

Given the possibility of MAD, what should India do?

On 7 October 2001, less that a month after the 9/11 attack, the US officially launched Operation Enduring Freedom⁹, invading Afghanistan, demanding that the Taliban hand over Osama bin Laden and to expel Al Qaeda. Preparations started on Sept 26^th 2001, fifteen days after the attack.

India's Nuclear Doctrine, besides specifying the response, should include comprehensive processes and protocols to ascertain, confirm and communicate that a nuclear attack has taken place. There can be absolutely no scope for error in determining and communicating this to the Prime Minister. India's nuclear doctrine should specify how long it will take from verification of incident, to communication, to action. Once the decision is taken to act, the impact of the response should be over in minutes.

The issue being debated currently is what should India's response be if Pakistan detonates a TNW, even if it targets Indian ground forces in Pakistan's territory¹⁰. The question is should India unleash its nuclear arsenal on Pakistan, shrug it off and continue fighting or initiate a measured response?

A Nuclear Weapon is a Nuclear Weapon and even if one TNW is launched by Pakistan, India should respond with such force that it debilitates Pakistan and prevents it from responding. This response could well be with conventional weapons that targets military installations and known TNW installations which by their very nature are situated close to the border.

It is imperative that all conceivable scenarios be identified and responses vetted militarily and politically such that if a situation arises depending on its nature, the option(s) are presented to the Prime Minister and the PM's council for a Go/No Go decision. This includes whisking away the PM and the PM's council to a “safe” location. Until this point there is no room for debate. A decision making process must be followed based on an established criteria. The PM may choose to make a few calls to the Pakistani counterpart before deciding.

That said, a number of initiatives ought to be taken as preventive measures. A nuclear attack can occur from Land, Air or Sea. The challenge for India is to institute defensive mechanisms to thwart any such attacks. This includes:

• Comprehensive border security
• Naval and Air patrolling and exercises to ensure readiness
• Develop Interceptor missiles to form an “Iron Dome”
• Accumulate significant conventional weapons with missile delivery systems
• Maintain a strategic nuclear advantage
• Regular testing of India's nuclear readiness, both defensive and offensive
• In depth intelligence of Pakistan's nuclear deployments both Strategic and Tactical with significant Conventional Weapons pointed at these nuclear deployments
• Satellite surveillance systems with Infrared capability
• Develop autonomous air and ground combat systems

In summary a strong defense is the best offense to respond to any conflict that India might encounter with Pakistan. In addition this should be accompanied by preparedness and flawless execution of the nuclear doctrine, should the need arise.

Notes:

1. http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Nuclearweaponswhohaswhat
2. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/report-pakistans-nuclear-arsenal-could-become-the-worlds-third-biggest/2015/08/26/6098478a-4c0c-11e5-80c2-106ea7fb80d4_story.html
3. http://tribune.com.pk/story/945689/pakistans-nuclear-arsenal-could-become-worlds-third-biggest-report/
4. http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/India-ready-for-nuclear-no-first-use-agreements/articleshow/44906401.cms
5. http://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/india-shouldnt-abandon-its-nuclear-doctrine-because-of-pakistans-tactical-nukes/
6. http://pib.nic.in/archieve/lreleng/lyr2003/rjan2003/04012003/r040120033.html
7. http://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/pakistans-nuclear-weapons-may-not-deter-indian-retaliation-but-destruction-mutual/
8. http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2003-01-27/news/27560676_1_defence-minister-george-fernandes-internal-problems-bbc-world
9. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/War_in_Afghanistan_(2001%E2%80%9314)#U.S._invasion_of_Afghanistan
10. http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/RevisitingIndiasNuclearDoctrine_gbalachandran_200614

The Brilliance in Modi’s Land Bill Strategy

By issuing an ordinance, which is a privilege granted in the Indian Democratic “Socialist” constitution and by reissuing it to extend it before the Rajya Sabha can vote on it, the Modi government has probably given a window of opportunity to initiate land acquisition in critical disputed areas. Furthermore, by adjusting their opening bid to stave off major objections, the Modi administration has taken a “balls to the wall approach” by calling a Joint Session to pass the amendments, since it is likely to be stalled in the Rajya Sabha.

This article by Swaminathan Aiyar provides some insights to the way Modi could succeed in getting his way.

http://blogs.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/Swaminomics/new-land-bill-will-win-not-lose-votes-for-modi/

There are stipulations in the Land Acquisition Act that are major obstacles to Rural Land Acquisition, most of which is categorized as either Agricultural or Forest regardless of no forest cover and no agricultural activity taking place. These are:

• Social impact assessment
• Rehabilitation and Resettlement

Both of the above pertain mostly to the landless that rely on the land they do not own for their subsistence. There is also a consent clause which may or may not apply.

Given the right price, conditions and benefits, farmers could be convinced that they stand to gain by selling their land. It is dealing with the affected landless that can present an insurmountable challenge. This is what Modi’s modification is attempting to overcome. The amendments facilitate the preference to industrialize established “corridors” rather than developing new industrial corridors for large projects in the hinterland.

Scaling down the obstacles mentioned above, would result in a “pro farmer” bill for the land owners. At most the amendments can be cast as an “anti-farming” bill since it may result in farm land being acquired for non-farming purposes. People who might be affected adversely are the landless who squat on land, often to the frustration of the rightful owner.

Addressing the Social Impact goes hand in hand with Relocation and Rehabilitation. Past experiences have shown the success rate of rehabilitating the landless, even when attempted with the best of intentions. It requires significant intervention at the personal level. It may look good on paper, successful execution is another matter.

Land Acquisition is a State issue and there are provisions permitted for the States to address the hurdles mentioned above. The NDA could have quietly gone about pursuing the development strategy in NDA controlled States and let the Opposition controlled States deal with their obstructive approach.

Rahul Gandhi has responded in typical Indian obstructionist manner in hoping that by thwarting development, the Congress can claim failure of the NDA and thereby make a better show at the next election.  By making this a National issue,  and banking on  the NDA showing the fruits of development, show casing happy farmers, Modi could point to Rahul claiming we have proved him wrong.

Rahul is right in stating that an election cannot be won by angering 67% of the population. 

The contrasting article, heavily left leaning and socialist in bent, feels Rahul has scored a point. In actuality, Rahul has bet on Modi not delivering.

http://www.ndtv.com/opinion/rahul-may-just-have-put-bjp-on-the-defensive-759859

And so if Modi wins, India wins and it would be a justified set back for Rahul and his party.

Why not institute guidelines that get rid of Floor Space Index

The setting of FSI is a constant battle in India. The forgone conclusion is that we have to build up in Urban areas. The debate is how high?

Why not get rid of FSI and allow builders to build as high as they want with the following stipulation:

1. Government chalks out green space for parks and play ground as part of the city’s master plan.
2. The building can have as many flats as can be accommodated, however 50% of the units must be a mix of studio and 1 BHK staff quarters that are strictly for servants and staff. Structure should be within defined plot boundaries.
3. Number of car parking spaces is 1.5 times the number of flats plus parking spaces for two wheelers, plus parking for visitors.
4. Building contracts with a private power supplier for power. Subsidized for the Staff.
5. The building recycles its water and minimizes its water consumption. Water is priced at a premium for owners, subsidized for staff.
6. The building has its own sewage treatment plant (STP) that is part of the recycling system. Local Power Generation from Bio-Gas, Bio-Mass.
7. One lift for every ten floors.  One service lift for every 20 floors.
8. Rainwater harvesting
9. Common areas lighted with solar power.
10. The building does garbage separation – compostable (wet), recyclable, thrash.
11. The only commercial activity allowed is a convenience store for residents.
12. Usual fire, hazard, safety infrastructure.

More conditions can be added to get rid of FSI all together.

Disappointment in Sydney

1. India cannot beat this Australian team with just one all rounder, besides the keeper. A rematch would probably lead to the same outcome.

Saurav Ganguly articlualted it best without mentioning the importance of all rounders. He said Australians have deep batting.

Here are some stats:

G. Maxwell, in at 4, scored 23 (14b, 3x4, 1x6) Bowled 5-0-18-0
S. Watson, in at 5, scored 28 (30b, 2x4, 1x6) Bowled 4-0-29-0
J. Faulkner, in at 7, scored 21 (12b, 3x4, 1x6) Bowled 9-1-59-3 (1nb, 1 wide)
M. Johnson, in at 9, scored 27 not out, (9b,4x4,1x6) Bowled 10-0-50-2 (2 wides)

These four all rounders added 100 runs! Each one of them bagged a 6! Everyone except Watson scored more runs than the balls they faced. Watson missed only by 2. Compared to the other three, he was a Turtle.

Starc and Hazelwood are the two only bowlers in the team.

Finch 81 of 116b,7x4,1x6, Watson and Clarke 10 of 12b, 1x4, were the only three batsmen that scored less runs than balls faced. Finch was the stabilizer, Smith and the others were the accelerators.

Everyone in the team except Clarke bagged a 6.

Note to selection committee "Think Strategy". It is a game of Brawn AND Brain

2. India pretty much had a cake walk to the Semis. SA was the only real competition India faced. Australia is clearly the better team. Their pace bowling was superior. The pitch is tuned for pace. Australia butchered India's bowling, India did not respond in kind.

3. Batting second changed the nature of the game. Scoring over 300 is a requirement at this stage of the game. Could India have pulled it off if they batted first?

4. Australia has about 25 Million people. If we selected and trained cricketers from our Middle Class pool of 250 Million people, India's B Team should beat any country's A Team! This is an environmental issue that involves facilities, opportunities and culture.

5. Strike should be rotated to the set batsmen. Every dot ball is a run for the other side. Kohli - 13 balls 1 run! Indians lack the killer instinct. When the odds are against you, you go down fighting, take big hit risks not running risks and getting run out.