The
nuclear threat to India from Pakistan is real. Reports indicate that
India's and Pakistan's nuclear arsenal is on par1.
Reports also indicate that Pakistan is stockpiling nuclear warheads
at the rate of about 20 a year2
and poised to become the third largest nuclear armed country3.
India has repeatedly stated
its traditional policy of not using nuclear weapons first and not
targeting non-nuclear weapons nations. India has also indicated that
it is prepared to convert these into bilateral or multilateral
legally binding “No First Use” (NFU) agreements incorporating
these two principles, while ruling out joining the non-proliferation
treaty4.
Pakistan on the other hand has made no such indications. Being the
weaker of the two nations, it holds the nuclear option as a threat to
mitigate massive losses in the event of an all out war. Pakistan
Foreign Secretary Aizaz Ahmad Chaudhry said that his country has
“low-yield, tactical nuclear weapons” (TNWs) to deal with India’s
so-called Cold Start doctrine5.
TNWs
are usually short range lower-intensity “tactical” weapons,
whereas strategic weapons are high-intensity long range weapons. This
disclosure of possessing TNWs prompts India to update its Nuclear
Doctrine6.
While
India has always maintained it wishes to coexist peacefully with
Pakistan, the reverse doesn't hold true. Consequently, India has to
temper and measure its responses to Pakistan's border infractions
with no clear advantage of possessing nuclear weapons. To counter
this, India has to develop a strategy to counter this disadvantage.
The
worst case scenario is if Pakistan, when pushed to the wall,
experiences a break down in the change of command resulting in a
rogue nuclear attack, which is then responded to by India, with force
majure, resulting in a Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD)7
and the possible annihilation of Pakistan. No one in their right mind
would wish this, but the specter of nuclear war prompted George
Fernandes, as India's Defense Minister in 2003, to allude to this
response8.
Given
the possibility of MAD, what should India do?
On 7 October 2001, less that a month after the 9/11 attack, the US officially launched Operation Enduring Freedom9, invading Afghanistan, demanding that the Taliban hand over Osama
bin Laden and to expel Al Qaeda. Preparations
started on Sept 26th
2001, fifteen days after the attack.
India's
Nuclear Doctrine, besides specifying the response, should include
comprehensive processes and protocols to ascertain, confirm and
communicate that a nuclear attack has taken place. There can be
absolutely no scope for error in determining and communicating this
to the Prime Minister. India's nuclear doctrine should specify how
long it will take from verification of incident, to communication, to
action. Once the decision is taken to act, the impact of the response
should be over in minutes.
The
issue being debated currently is what should India's response be if
Pakistan detonates a TNW, even if it targets Indian ground forces in
Pakistan's territory10.
The question is should India unleash its nuclear arsenal on Pakistan,
shrug it off and continue fighting or initiate a measured response?
A
Nuclear Weapon is a Nuclear Weapon and even if one TNW is launched by
Pakistan, India should respond with such force that it debilitates
Pakistan and prevents it from responding. This response could well be
with conventional weapons that targets military installations and
known TNW installations which by their very nature are situated close
to the border.
It
is imperative that all conceivable scenarios be identified and
responses vetted militarily and politically such that if a situation
arises depending on its nature, the option(s) are presented to the
Prime Minister and the PM's council for a Go/No Go decision. This
includes whisking away the PM and the PM's council to a “safe”
location. Until this point there is no room for debate. A decision
making process must be followed based on an established criteria. The
PM may choose to make a few calls to the Pakistani counterpart before
deciding.
That
said, a number of initiatives ought to be taken as preventive
measures. A nuclear attack can occur from Land, Air or Sea. The
challenge for India is to institute defensive mechanisms to thwart
any such attacks. This includes:
- Comprehensive border security
- Naval and Air patrolling and exercises to ensure readiness
- Develop Interceptor missiles to form an “Iron Dome”
- Accumulate significant conventional weapons with missile delivery systems
- Maintain a strategic nuclear advantage
- Regular testing of India's nuclear readiness, both defensive and offensive
- In depth intelligence of Pakistan's nuclear deployments both Strategic and Tactical with significant Conventional Weapons pointed at these nuclear deployments
- Satellite surveillance systems with Infrared capability
- Develop autonomous air and ground combat systems
In
summary a strong defense is the best offense to respond to any
conflict that India might encounter with Pakistan. In addition this
should be accompanied by preparedness and flawless execution of the
nuclear doctrine, should the need arise.
Notes:
No comments:
Post a Comment